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This report prepares the Task Force to evaluate a new capital markets insurance concept:  
securities misinformation insurance.  Designed to enhance the competitiveness of Canadian 
securities market, this new insurance would compensate investors for losses caused by Canadian 
securities law violations.   
The most powerful objection to this new concept is that investors do not need a new insurance 
program for securities misinformation losses. Individual and institutional investors already can 
spread securities misinformation losses by holding a diversified portfolio. Investors already are 
entitled to receive compensation for these losses through securities litigation, most significantly 
under the new Ontario secondary market liability legislation described in Section 4, ii.  Moreover, 
Canadian public companies already have insurance that spreads these liability losses: Directors’ 
and Officers’ Insurance.  
Nevertheless, a securities misinformation insurance program has the potential to provide the 
following systemic benefits to the Canadian capital markets: 
• Improved compliance with securities laws (resulting from cost internalization by issuers
and governance efforts by the securities misinformation insurance program); and
• Enhanced investor confidence (resulting from the signalling effect of what amounts to a
warranty of compliance with disclosure requirements).*
Whether a new insurance program would in fact produce these benefits would depend in 
significant part on the design of the program.  On the one hand, the program could be designed as 
a form of excess insurance that would pay investors only after they exhausted the available assets 
of the responsible parties. In that event, the insurance program would, in effect, guarantee the 
solvency of the responsible parties (up to the limits of the benefits provided by the program).  On 
the other hand, the program could be designed as primary insurance that would pay investors 
* In addition, it is argued that merit-based investors may not be diversified and thus would benefit from the
loss spreading provided by an insurance program.  This latter benefit would be unlikely to justify imposing
the insurance loading costs on all investors for reasons that are explained in the report.
4
.  
without requiring that they first bring a private party civil liability action.  In that event, the 
investors would assign to the insurance program their rights against the responsible parties, and 
the insurance program could then bring civil liability actions against those parties.  
The excess insurance approach would be cheaper and less intrusive for Canadian public 
companies, but it would be unlikely to enhance securities law compliance.  The primary 
insurance approach would be more likely to enhance securities law compliance and, possibly, 
investor confidence, but it would be more expensive and intrusive.  Under the latter, primary 
insurance approach, the securities misinformation insurance program could become a strong 
securities market regulator.  The “regulation” would come in the form of underwriting 
requirements and other requirements imposed through litigation against the responsible parties.  
Whether a new, strong, and potentially unaccountable securities regulator would be desirable is a 
question for the Task Force to consider.  
This report describes these and other important insurance design questions. To illustrate how the 
design variables fit together, the report outlines three different securities misinformation 
insurance scenarios.  The first scenario presents a government sponsored, primary insurance 
program. The second scenario presents an industry sponsored excess insurance program.  The 
third scenario presents a private market excess insurance approach.  The author of this report is an 
insurance expert, not a securities or corporate law expert.  The goal is to educate the Task Force 
about the insurance issues so that they can weigh the potential costs and benefits of a new 




Recommendation #1:  Evaluate the design options and determine the most favourable form 
for a Securities Misinformation Insurance program.   
Recommendation #2:  Gauge the appeal of such a program to stakeholders. 
Recommendation #3:  If the program is sufficiently appealing, retain an actuarial firm with 
experience pricing D&O insurance to specify the pricing and funding needed to support the 
program, as outlined in the companion report of Professor Harry Panjer.   
6
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3. Introduction 
 
Insurance institutions protect individuals from a variety of risks in the Canadian capital markets.  
These include the risks of: 
 
• Bank deposits disappearing in the event of a bank failure (CDIC); 
• Investments disappearing due to investment dealer failure (CIPF, CIPC); 
• Pension benefits disappearing in the event of a bankruptcy of a corporation and the 
inability of the pension plan to pay promised benefits (PBGF); and 
• Insurance benefits disappearing due to insolvency of an insurance company (Assuris, 
PACICC).  
 
There is no direct insurance against loss of investment value due to misinformation in the 
securities market.  At present this risk is addressed through: 
 
• Diversification by investors; 
• Litigation on behalf of investors damaged by misinformation; and 
• Enforcement by government agencies and self-regulatory organizations. 
 
Some misinformation risk is insured indirectly through liability insurance that covers defendants 
in securities-related litigation (principally directors and officers liability insurance but also 
professional liability insurance).  What would a program of direct insurance against investment 
losses from securities misinformation look like?   Could it be designed so that the benefits exceed 
the costs?   
 
This report addresses these questions.  Section four describes the existing securities 
misinformation deterrence and loss spreading institutions that any new insurance program would 
supplement or replace. As this discussion notes, investors already can spread Canadian securities 
misinformation losses at low cost by holding a diversified portfolio of Canadian securities.   
Moreover, private market civil liability already provides a way for investors to receive some 
compensation for their misinformation losses.  For these reasons, investor compensation does not 
provide as strong a justification for a new securities misinformation insurance program as it does 
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Section 5 begins by introducing a set of theoretical issues that inform the design of insurance 
institutions generally and discusses those issues in the context of securities misinformation 
insurance.  This discussion sharpens the analysis of the existing diversification and loss-spreading 
possibilities and argues that a new securities misinformation insurance program may be able to be 
justified on the basis of systematic benefits: improved securities law compliance and increased 
investor confidence in the transparency of the Canadian securities market.  Section 6 then 
describes the main variables that should be considered in the design of a securities 
misinformation insurance program.  Section 7 outlines three scenarios that illustrate these 
variables in combination.  Section 8 concludes by summarizing the report in the form of a 
conceptual cost benefit analysis.   
 
This report raises theoretical and conceptual issues.  It does not provide answers.  The goal is to 
explicate the design variables and tradeoffs in order to allow members of the Task Force to reach 
their own conclusions about the potential costs and benefits of a new securities misinformation 
insurance program and the form, if any, that it should take.  Evaluating those costs and benefits 
requires making predictions about the behaviour of the Canadian securities markets (and current 
and potential investors in those markets) in response to a securities misinformation insurance 
program.  Such predictions are the province of experts and professionals with more knowledge 
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4. Securities Misinformation Loss: Existing Deterrence and Loss-Spreading 
Institutions 
 
Securities misinformation insurance is insurance that compensates investors for a “securities 
misinformation loss.”   In this report, “securities misinformation loss” will mean legally 
compensable investment loss from inadequate or untimely disclosure as defined by Canadian 
securities law.  A securities misinformation loss occurs when, for example, an investor buys a 
security at a price that is inflated because the issuer withheld bad news from the market and then 
holds that security until the bad news is revealed and the value of the security declines as a result.     
 
Canadian securities law defines this securities misinformation loss in two distinct ways: first, by 
defining what kinds of investment losses count and, second, by defining how much of these 
losses are compensable.  While there is no theoretical reason why securities law must play such a 
central role in defining the scope of a securities misinformation insurance program, there are 
practical benefits.  Using securities law to define the scope of covered losses holds constant the 
kinds and amounts of investment losses that are compensable and, thus, places a sharper focus on 
the potential effects of creating a new form of insurance to facilitate that compensation.  In 
addition, confining securities misinformation insurance to legally compensable losses may make 
securities enforcement history a better guide to pricing.1
 
Institutions that presently address securities misinformation loss in Canada include investment 
diversification mechanisms, civil liability, liability insurance, government enforcement, and self-
regulatory organizations.  The sections that follow briefly describe these institutions, setting the 
stage for the discussion of securities misinformation insurance that follows. 
 
i. Investor Diversification  
 
Modern finance theory and research teach that investors can protect themselves against firm-
specific risks by holding a diversified portfolio.2  This means that investors do not, in theory, 
                                                 
1 The recent adoption of secondary market liability reduces the value of history for predicting Canadian 
misinformation insurance losses See R.S.O. 1990, c.55, § 138.  See also William Braithwaite and John 
Ciardullo, Canada’s new liability law focuses first on deterrence, 2004 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 25 (2004). 
2 See generally Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber, Stephen J. Brown, William N. Goetzmann, MODERN 
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need a new insurance program to spread their exposure to securities misinformation loss.  If they 
have enough assets, they can do this themselves.  Otherwise, they can create a diversified 
portfolio by investing in mutual funds. This possibility and its importance for evaluating the need 
for securities misinformation insurance are discussed in more detail in Section 5.5.  For the 
moment the important point is that investors already have a low cost way to spread their Canadian 
securities misinformation losses – by holding a diversified portfolio of Canadian securities.3 This 
fact distinguishes securities misinformation risks from the risks addressed by the existing forms 
capital markets insurance listed at the outset (e.g. bank deposit insurance) and undercuts the loss-
spreading justification for a new securities misinformation insurance program.  
 
ii. Private-Party Civil Liability   
 
Provincial law provides for private plaintiff civil liability actions for securities misinformation 
losses in both the primary and secondary securities markets.4  For the primary securities market, 
the most important basis for liability is misrepresentation in the prospectus.5  For the secondary 
securities market (i.e. trading in already-issued securities), the most important basis for liability is 
the new secondary market liability regime recently enacted in Ontario (and proposed in British 
Columbia).6  In addition, innocent counterparties to insider trading and affected institutions may 
bring actions to recover damages and disgorge benefits from insiders.7  
 
These liability regimes define the misinformation losses that would be covered by a securities 
misinformation insurance program.  Although this report does not aim to describe private-party 
civil liability in detail, several features of the new Ontario secondary market private-party civil 
                                                                                                                                                 
considerable reason to doubt that investors in fact adequately diversify their investments. See, e.g., Shlomo 
Bernartzi and Richard Thaler, How Much is Investor Autonomy Worth? Working Paper 2002 (available on 
SSRN.com) (reporting research that suggests that even when choosing among investment funds investors 
do not pick the portfolio that is best based on their own criteria).  
3 See Burton Malkiel, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET at 224 (2nd ed 2001) (including accounting 
fraud in a list of firm-specific risks that investors can reduce through diversification: “the whole point of 
portfolio theory is that, to the extent that stocks don’t move in tandem all the time, variations in the returns 
from any one security tend to be washed away or smoothed out by complementary variations in the returns 
from other securities”).  The extent to which securities misinformation losses are diversifiable is addressed 
in part II. 
4 See Jeffrey G. MacIntosh and Christopher C. Nicholls, SECURITIES LAW at 161 & 248 (Irwin Pub. 2002); 
Braithwaite & Ciardullo, supra note 1.  
5 OSA section 130, discussed in MacIntosh & Nicholls supra note 4, at 161 et seq. 
6 See Braithwaite and Ciardullo, supra note 1.  
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liability bear mentioning.  First, the legislation allows investors to recover from the issuer and 
other defendants simply by proving a securities violation in relation to a “core document”,8 
without the scienter requirement of U.S. securities law, subject to the following liability caps:   
 
• For an issuer: the greater of $1 million or 5% of market capitalization (determined in the 
period immediately following the correction of the misinformation).  
• For a corporate “influential person”: the greater of $1 million or 5% of the market 
capitalization of the corporate influential person. 
• For an individual director, officer or “influential person”: the greater of $25,000 or 50% 
of the individual’s compensation during the preceding 12 months.   
• For an expert (e.g., a “gatekeeper” such as an auditor or lawyer): the greater of $1 million 
or the revenue earned from the issuer or its affiliates during the preceding 12 months. 9 
 
Except for the cap on the issuer’s liability, all of these caps are lifted if the investor proves that 
the defendant’s violation was “knowing” (a level of knowledge that appears likely to be more 
demanding than the scienter requirement under U.S. securities law).10   
 
The damages rules under the legislation also favour investors in two further respects:  
  
• Plaintiffs are entitled to a straightforward, easily computable damages assessment, with 
defendants bearing the burden of proof to show that the presumed damages were in fact 
not caused by the violation.11  
• Attorneys’ fees are to be paid by the losing party in addition to the damages in the event 
of a successful civil liability action.12   
 
                                                 
8 R.S.O. 1990, c.S.5., § 138.1 (e.g., prospectus, annual and interim financial statements, management 
discussion and analysis). 
9 R.S.O. 1990, c.55, § 138.1 & 138.7.  See also R.R.O. 1990, REGULATION 1015, part XVI § 249. 
10 R.S.O. 1990, c.55, § 138.7(2). 
11 R.S.O. 1990, c.55, § 138.5. 
12 R.S.O. 1990, c.55, § 138.11. Although fee shifting provisions are often thought to be a pro-defendant 
reform, the medical malpractice experience suggests that these provisions benefit plaintiffs more than 
defendants, principally because defendants have assets (most importantly liability insurance) from which to 
pay the fees far more often than plaintiffs. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behaviour in 
Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say? 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943-83 (2002).  An 
institutional plaintiff in a securities fraud case would be somewhat more like a defendant in a malpractice 
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In theory these investor protection aspects of the Ontario legislation will allow Canadian 
securities litigation to provide quicker and more complete compensation to investors than does 
U.S. securities law.  Turning theory into reality will require the development of an active 
plaintiffs securities litigation bar.  
 
iii. Liability Insurance 
 
Most publicly traded companies purchase directors and officers (D&O) insurance,13 and it is 
common practice for the experts who are subject to potential securities liability (e.g., accountants, 
lawyers, underwriters) to purchase professional liability insurance.  D&O insurance typically 
provides coverage both for the directors and officers and for the corporation for its own liability 
in connection with claims against directors and officers.14  Research shows that D&O insurance 
almost always provides complete protection for directors and officers who are defendants in 
private-party civil liability securities actions.  These individuals only very, very rarely have to pay 
any of the damages from their own funds, except for cases in which the director or officer acted 
with a high degree of wrongful intent.15 While typically D&O insurance policies exclude 
coverage for fraud by a director or officer, as a practical matter such allegations usually settle 
with the underwriter accepting liability rather than running the risk that at trial damages are 
awarded but fraud is not established.16 Even private-party civil liability claims against the issuer 
                                                 
13 Tillinghast Towers Perrin, 2003 DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE SURVEY at 21 
(reporting that 92% of public companies in Canada purchase D&O insurance). 
14 See generally Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and 
Liability Insurance, 51 Bus. Law. 573 (1996). 
15 See Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STANFORD 
L.REV. 1055 (2006); Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability 
Across Countries, SSRN abstract 438321 (2004) (considering Canada among other countries). The recent 
WorldCom and Enron settlements, which required directors to pay out of their own pockets, are recent 
exceptions in the U.S. that may prove the rule about the absence of actual director and officer liability. See 
Gretchen Morgenson, Ex-Directors at WorldCom Settle Anew, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2005) (describing 
agreement according to which former WorldCom directors will personally contribute to settlement 
amount).   
16 Significantly, this fraud exclusion is commonly subject to a “final adjudication” condition that obligates 
the insurer to fund the criminal and civil defense of directors or officers unless and until the fraud is finally 
adjudicated in the proceeding for which coverage is sought. See John H. Mathias, Jr., Timothy W. Burns, 
Matthew M. Meumeier, Jerry J Burgdoerfer, Directors and Officers Liability: Prevention, Insurance and 
Indemnification at 8-14 (2003) (collecting cases holding that “if the exclusion requires a final adjudication, 
that adjudication must take place in the underlying action for which coverage is sought”).  Because 
shareholder litigation almost always is settled (and, therefore, not “adjudicated”), the Fraud exclusion does 
not have the impact that a simple reading of the D&O insurance policy might suggest. Mathias et al, supra 
note – at 8-15 (noting that the application of the final adjudication provision “drastically diminishes the 
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itself typically are settled within the limits of the issuer’s D&O insurance policy,17 although there 
may be a trend in the U.S. of increasing numbers of settlements above the policy limits.18  There 
has been less systematic research on private-party civil liability actions brought against 
gatekeepers such as accountants or lawyers, but anecdotal evidence suggests that these claims 
also are typically resolved by settlements within the limits of the available insurance policies.19    
 
In combination, the available evidence strongly suggests that liability insurance covers the 
substantial majority of the civil damages paid for securities violations, certainly in the U.S. and 
very likely in Canada.  This means that Canada and the U.S. already have securities 
misinformation insurance of a sort.  Defendants purchase this insurance as protection against the 
costs of securities liability claims, rather than to provide compensation to investors.  But, to the 
extent that defendants are held liable, the risks that are spread are largely the same, despite the 
fact that the investor is only the incidental beneficiary of the liability insurance.20  Like investors’ 
diversification options, the fact that securities misinformation losses already are spread by third-
party liability insurance provides a reason to question the compensation justification for a new 
insurance program.  
                                                                                                                                                 
final adjudication, there almost always are others who do not come within the scope of the exclusion yet 
had opportunity to prevent or reduce the impact of the fraud.  Some more recent policies contain broader 
fraud exclusions, but these exclusions have not yet been tested.  Id. 
17 See, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 503-
504 (1997).  The Cox article does not provide strong support for this assertion.  Based on ongoing 
qualitative research, I can report that D&O insurance industry insiders believe that most securities action 
are settled within D&O insurance policy limits, at least in the U.S.  See Baker & Griffith, infra note 36.  
Using U.S. data, Cornerstone reports that “over 65% of all [securities class action] settlements in 2004 were 
for less than $10 million” (well below the typical D&O insurance policy limit for a publicly traded 
corporation) and that only 7 settlements were larger than $100 million.  See Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. 
Ryan, POST-REFORM ACT SECURITIES SETTLEMENTS; UPDATED THROUGH DECEMBER 2004 (Cornerstone 
Research 2005). Small cap companies typically have D&O insurance policies in excess of $20 million, and 
large cap companies typically have D&O insurance policy limits in excess of $100 million.  See Tillinghast 
Towers Perrin, 2005 DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY. 
18 See Elaine Buckberg, Todd Foster, Ronald I Miller, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION: ARE WORLDCOM AND ENRON THE NEW STANDARD? (NERA 2005) 
19 There is a substantial theoretical literature on gatekeeper liability in the securities context.  See, e.g., John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. 
REV. 301 (2004); Assaf Hamdami, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003-04); Frank Partnoy, 
Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 491 
(2001); Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. L. REV. 916 (1997-98) 
20 While there are exclusions in D&O insurance policies for intentional harm, these exclusions do not 
appear in practice to limit D&O insurers’ liability because there are almost always some beneficiaries 
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iv. Government Enforcement 
 
Securities law enforcement in Canada takes place at the provincial and territorial level of 
government, with the result that the agencies involved vary by province and territory. Most of the 
enforcement activity takes place in the provinces in which the leading business centres are 
located: Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec, and Alberta.  Consideration of the scope and 
intensity of government enforcement lies well beyond the bounds of this project,21 but it is 
important to remember that the money needed to set up and administer securities misinformation 
insurance program could be used instead to strengthen government enforcement.   
 
v. Self-Regulatory Organizations  
The Investment Dealers Association of Canada and the Mutual Fund Dealers Association each 
regulate to some degree the conduct of their members, and Market Regulation Services, Inc. 
regulates trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange and certain other markets.22  These self-
regulatory organizations (SROs) have the authority to investigate and discipline their members 
and other designated parties, both for violations of securities laws and of their bylaws and 
regulations.  Sanctions include fines and the suspension or revocation of approval to trade or 
work in a member firm.23  SROs have created investor protection funds to compensate investors 
for losses due to the bankruptcy of an SRO member.  The existence of these funds suggests that a 
SRO would have the authority to establish a securities misinformation insurance program for its 
members, were it to conclude that such a program would be beneficial.  Accordingly, one of the 
scenarios developed in part II involves a fund established by the TSX to protect investors from 
securities misinformation losses relating to shares traded on the TSX. 
 
                                                 
21 For discussion of Canadian securities enforcement see Poonam Puri, Enforcement Effectiveness in the 
Canadian Capital Markets, CMI Working Paper (December 2005). 
22 RS regulates the following markets: TSX, TSX V, CNQ, Bloomberg, Liquidnet, and BlockBook.  See 
http://www.rs.ca/en/home/ (last visited March 19, 2006).  
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5. Insurance Issues 
 
Having described in very general terms the institutional landscape into which a new securities 
misinformation insurance program would fit, it is now time to describe the various forms this 
program might take.  This Section introduces a set of theoretical issues that inform the design of 
insurance institutions generally and discusses these issues in the context of securities 
misinformation insurance.  This discussion will sharpen some of the earlier questions about the 
need for this new kind of insurance and suggest a way to think about the potential costs and 
benefits. Section 6 will describe the main design variables that would affect the form and function 
of this insurance and how these variables affect the costs and benefits of the insurance.  Section 7 
will outline three scenarios that illustrate these variables in combination and then compare and 
contrast them.  
 
i. Moral Hazard  
 
Moral hazard is a longstanding concern in the insurance trade that 20th century economists 
generalized as part of the economics of information.24  The basic idea is an intuitive one:  
insurance against loss reduces the incentives to avoid loss.  “Moral hazard” is the name given to 
that effect on incentives. In the securities context, providing misinformation insurance to what the 
new Ontario secondary market liability legislation describes as “influential persons” (e.g., 
controlling shareholders) or to corporate insiders could create a moral hazard by reducing the 
downside risk of their participation or acquiescence in securities violations.  Providing 
misinformation insurance to other securities holders could also create a (less serious) moral 
hazard by reducing their incentive to avoid investing in firms that pose a higher risk of securities 
violations.  For this latter, larger class of investors the degree of moral hazard depends on the 
extent to which non-insiders can accurately identify firms that pose a higher securities 
misinformation risk.25
                                                 
24 See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). 
25 Some readers have suggested that a securities misinformation insurance program would reduce investors’ 
incentive to diversify their investments and reward investors who failed to do so.  On reflection, this seems 
unlikely because securities misinformation is just one of a host of risks that affect investment value.  For 
this reason, the marginal impact of reducing or eliminating that single risk would be unlikely to change the 
overall incentive to diversify. At most it would affect the expected return of classes of investments that are 
more exposed to securities misinformation risk and, thus, potentially change the relative share of those 
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Like principal agent problems generally, moral hazard is a matter of degree, and there are 
strategies to manage it.  As this suggests, the fact that securities misinformation insurance 
presents a potential moral hazard problem does not provide a reason to reject that insurance.  
Rather, the challenge is to design the insurance to address the moral hazard concerns and then to 
evaluate whether the resulting program would serve a useful purpose.  Common strategies for 
managing moral hazard that could be used for securities misinformation insurance include 
deductibles and co-insurance (requiring the investor to share in the loss) and subrogation 
(allowing the fund to seek redress from responsible parties).  In addition, the program could be 
designed so that little or no benefits would be provided to influential persons, insiders, or others 
with enhanced monitoring or control opportunities.  Finally, as a member of the Task Force 
noted, the reputation damage to individuals who wish to “remain in the game” would also help to 
counteract the moral hazard of securities misinformation insurance. 
 
ii. Adverse Selection 
 
Adverse selection is another longstanding concern in the insurance trade.26  As with moral 
hazard, the basic idea is intuitive: someone who knows that she is more likely to suffer a loss will 
value insurance against that loss more highly than someone who knows that she is less likely to 
suffer that kind of loss.  Provided that individuals have reliable information about their risk of 
loss, the dynamics of adverse selection mean that high-risk individuals will disproportionately 
populate voluntary insurance arrangements, unless the insurer is able to take adequate 
countermeasures (such as identifying high-risk individuals and charging them a higher price).   
 
In the securities misinformation insurance context at least, adverse selection poses much less 
public policy concern than moral hazard.  Although adverse selection can in some cases prevent 
the formation of an insurance pool, adverse selection problems rarely pose significant problems to 
properly designed insurance arrangements27 and would be unlikely to do so in the securities 
                                                                                                                                                 
securities misinformation insurance program: making the target class of securities (whether Canadian 
regulated or traded securities) relatively more attractive to investors. 
26 See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, in 
Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle, eds., RISK AND MORALITY (U. Toronto P. 2003) (also published at 9 
CONN. INS. L. J. 371).  Adverse selection is sometimes called “anti-selection” in the insurance trade. 





.     
      
misinformation context.  Mandatory participation requirements, if enforced, always take care of 
adverse selection.  Moreover, risk-based pricing can reduce adverse selection to a considerable 
extent, as long as the entity that purchases the insurance does not have too great an information 
advantage.  Even then, purchasing the insurance can be sufficiently desirable that low-risk entities 
choose not to drop out of the insurance pool even if prices do not fully discriminate on the basis 
of risk.  For example, entities that purchase public D&O insurance surely have an information 
advantage over their D&O insurers with regards to the propensity of the particular directors and 
officers to commit securities law violations, yet purchase of D&O insurance is widespread among 
publicly traded companies in Canada,28 demonstrating that this information imbalance does not 
lead to an unsustainable degree of adverse selection. 
 
iii. Risk Aversion 
 
Risk aversion is the term given to individuals’ preference for certainty.  Risk aversion is one of 
the primary justifications for insurance.  From one perspective, insurance simply redistributes 
money from winners (people who do not suffer loss) to losers (people who do suffer loss).  All 
the people involved in the insurance enterprise must be paid, so this redistribution is not free.  
Absent some reason for understanding why winners and losers would want to contract in advance 
for this redistribution, insurance might appear simply to increase the total costs of loss by 
imposing these additional transaction costs.  Risk aversion helps explain why insurance does 
more than simply impose additional transaction costs. (The other reasons are the related benefit of 
diversification and the positive externalities of insurance, both of which are discussed shortly.)  
People derive a real benefit from reducing their exposure to risk, a benefit that can be more 
substantial in the aggregate than the transaction costs required to run the insurance operation.   
 
iv. Loading Costs 
 
Loading costs is the insurance term for these transaction costs.29  Loading costs vary 
significantly, from a low of one half of one percent for U.S. Social Security retirement benefits30 
                                                 
28 See Tillinghast, supra note 13. Cf., John E. Core, The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Premium: An 
Outside Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 449 (2000). 
29 Karl Borch, ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE 163 (1990) (describing the “loading” of the insurance contract as 
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to thirty percent for property casualty insurance in the aggregate31 (and even higher for title 
insurance).  Loading costs for Social Security retirement benefits are so low for a variety of 
reasons: marketing and underwriting expenses are nearly zero due to mandatory participation and 
strict income-based premium payments; investment costs are nearly zero due to the pay-as-you-
go nature of the funding mechanism and the limitation of trust fund investments; and loss 
adjustment expenses are very low due to the ease of determining eligibility.   
 
Loading costs for a securities misinformation insurance program would depend on how the 
program is designed.  Thus full consideration of loading cost issues must wait for presentation of 
the design variables in the next section.  In the meantime, one point of comparison is directors’ 
and officers’ liability insurance, which has loading costs that consume between 20 to 30 percent 
of premiums.32  Although a mandatory securities misinformation insurance program would not 
have all of the same administrative expenses as D&O insurance (for example, sales expenses 
would be much lower), it would have some administrative expenses that D&O insurance does 
not.  For example, claims-handling costs for D&O insurers are lower than some other forms of 
casualty insurance because D&O insurance includes the costs of defending the securities liability 
claims as part of the indemnity payments (i.e., defence costs count against the policy limit), rather 
than as part of the loss adjustment expense as is the case in most other forms of liability 
insurance.   By contrast, with a securities misinformation insurance program, the costs of 
determining liability and damages would be part of the loss adjustment expense.  The insurance 
program will not compensate investors unless it is satisfied that there were securities violations 
and that the investors were damaged; that process seems likely to be expensive. 
 
Moreover, unless the new insurance program eliminated civil liability, issuers would continue to 
purchase D&O insurance.  Thus, the premiums that the issuers would pay for securities 
misinformation insurance would come on top of their D&O insurance premiums.  Yet, unless the 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 See Congressional Budget Office, ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF PRIVATE ACCOUNTS IN SOCIAL SECURITY, 
Chapter 3 (2004) (reporting administrative costs of $2.1 billion for 2002, benefit payments of $388.1 
billion, and revenue (payroll taxes plus investment income) of $539.3 billion), available at: 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5277&sequence=0&from=0#anchor  According to the Council of 
Canadians, the loading costs for Canadian public pensions is about one percent.  See 
http://www.canadians.org/display_document.htm?COC_token=024ZY24&id=62&isdoc=1&catid=87
31 Insurance Information Institute, Insurance Fact Book. 
32 Marc Siegel, The Dilemmas in the D&O Market:  Where Do We Go from Here?  Presentation at 2006 
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program is designed to substantially increase the rate of claiming, the compensation paid to 
defrauded investors would remain largely the same (except in cases in which the damages exceed 




Diversification is what enables insurance institutions to spread individuals’ losses, providing the 
main benefit that makes the insurance loading costs worth incurring. Insurance can spread the 
losses of the unfortunate few (for whom risk matures into loss) because of the premiums paid by 
the many (for whom the risk does not mature into loss).   Diversification has become such a focus 
in the finance field generally that it is easy to forget that insurance institutions pioneered 
diversification. Remembering this history, however, poses an immediate challenge to the concept 
of insurance as a protection against investment loss. If the main benefit of insurance is 
diversification, why do we need insurance for a risk that can be diversified much more cheaply in 
other ways?  
 
Holding a diversified portfolio provides investors with substantial protection against investment 
losses from securities fraud by limiting the portion of any individual’s assets that are invested in 
firms that commit securities fraud. Moreover, private-party civil liability already provides a way 
for investors to obtain some compensation for their securities misinformation losses. Securities 
misinformation insurance would further reduce the securities misinformation losses of a 
diversified investor.  But it would do so at the price of decreasing the gains from the rest of the 
investor’s portfolio – because of the premiums for the insurance paid by the issuers of these other 
securities.  Thus, for a diversified investor, a securities misinformation insurance program would 
be an expensive way to take money out of one pocket (the portion of the portfolio that does not 
suffer securities misinformation losses) in order to put it into another (the portion of the portfolio 
that does suffer such losses).33
                                                 
33 The following thought experiment illustrates this point:   
1. Assume a market that is efficient except that investors cannot identify which entities will violate 
securities laws.  In that situation the market will discount securities prices to take into account 
securities misinformation.  Assume that discount is 5%.   
2. Now assume mandatory securities misinformation insurance that provides complete protection for 
securities misinformation at no cost to issuers or investors.  Securities prices would immediately 
rise 5% (because the market would no longer be discounting securities prices to take into account 
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As this discussion should make clear, questioning the need for securities misinformation 
insurance on loss-spreading grounds does not require that securities misinformation losses be 
diversifiable in the strong sense that holding a diversified portfolio would essentially eliminate 
that risk.  Indeed, securities misinformation losses almost certainly are not diversifiable in that 
strong sense.  Some portion of securities misinformation losses surely is systemic.  For one thing, 
securities misinformation losses are likely to be biased in one direction.  While there is some 
evidence that insiders sometimes withhold good news,34 disclosure violations seem more likely to 
involve the failure to announce bad news.  In addition, asset bubbles may increase the likelihood 
of securities violations, and the bursting of a bubble surely increases the likelihood that violations 
will be detected, suggesting not only that the losses are biased in one direction, but also that they 
are correlated to at least some degree.   
 
When evaluating the institutional advantage of securities misinformation insurance, the question 
is not whether holding a diversified investment portfolio eliminates securities misinformation 
risk, but rather whether a new insurance program is a better strategy for spreading securities 
misinformation losses than investor diversification.  Because the loading costs of insurance are so 
much greater than the relatively small fees required to purchase a diversified investment portfolio, 
the answer almost certainly is “No.” 
 
Investors’ existing ability to spread losses - and also obtain compensation in cases covered by the 
Ontario legislation - without the insurance constitutes a fundamental difference between 
securities misinformation losses and losses addressed by existing forms of capital markets 
insurance.  These capital markets insurance programs protect individuals from losses that cannot 
otherwise adequately be spread or compensated.  Pension guaranty funds protect individuals with 
defined benefit pension plans from the insolvency of their employer – a risk that employees 
                                                                                                                                                 
3. Now assume that all the firms with securities trading in the market have to pay for that insurance, 
but that there are no transaction costs.  Securities prices immediately fall 5% (because the market 
is now bearing the misinformation losses in the form of insurance premiums). 
4. Now allow for the existence of transaction costs.  Securities prices fall further, below the original 
5% discount (because the insurance premiums will be greater than the total misinformation losses, 
reflecting insurance loading costs).  
34 Cf., Charles Forell, Five More Companies Show Suspicious Option Patterns, WALL STREET JOURNAL, 
May 22, 2006 (reporting that the suspicious pattern could be the result of dating the options ahead of the 
release of good news or, more likely, backdating); SEC Files Insider Suit Tied to Bid for Placer, WALL 
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otherwise could not diversify.  Insurance guaranty funds protect individuals from the insolvency 
of their insurer – a risk that insurance policyholders otherwise could not diversify.  Broker/dealer 
insurance funds protect individuals from the insolvency of their broker or dealer – a risk that 
investors cannot realistically manage through diversification.35  Bank deposit insurance protects 
depositors from the insolvency of their bank – a risk that they cannot realistically manage through 
diversification.  Because individuals cannot adequately diversify their exposure to these other 
risks on their own, we can be reasonably certain that these other forms of capital markets 
insurance provide substantial social welfare benefits (because of the risk aversion of the 
individuals insured), notwithstanding the transaction costs imposed. By contrast, individuals 
already can spread their securities misinformation losses without a new securities misinformation 
insurance program.   
 
But what about non-diversified investors?  Surely they would benefit from the diversification 
provided by a new securities misinformation insurance program.   
 
I think not, with the limited exception of investors who are unable to diversify (for example 
employees in defined contribution pension plans that are shaped in a way that favours investing in 
the employers’ securities). The better solution for these investors would be removing the 
obstacles to diversification.  There are two reasons.  First, even non-diversified investors have 
access to private-party civil liability actions to obtain compensation.  Although civil liability is 
not yet well-developed in Canada, it does provide compensation for some losses, and the new 
Ontario legislation is promising.  Thus, the policy choice the Task Force is facing is not between 
no compensation and complete compensation.  Rather, the choice is between some compensation 
and more compensation. Second, although non-diversified investors surely would prefer to 
receive compensation after a loss has occurred, the relevant question is what they would prefer 
before a loss.  Before the loss, non-diversified investors have revealed a preference that suggests 
that they would not value securities misinformation insurance. Holding a diversified portfolio 
would protect these investors from all firm-specific ways to lose money, and distributing risk 
through diversification is nearly free.  Investors who pass up the opportunity to distribute all these 
risks, nearly for free, would be unlikely to adopt an expensive risk distribution strategy for a 
                                                 
35 While investors could reduce their exposure to the risk of broker/dealer insolvency by using multiple 
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single category of investment risk – unless there is something qualitatively different about 
securities misinformation risk, as compared to other firm-specific risks.     
 
Some members of the Task Force suggested that a securities misinformation insurance program 
might facilitate “merit-based investing” (i.e. investing to beat the market) and, thus, the insurance 
would in fact provide non-diversified investors with a service that they would value.  The idea is 
that the risk of fraudulent information is qualitatively different from other firm-specific losses 
because merit-based investing depends on accurate information.  Whether merit-based investors 
would therefore find securities misinformation insurance sufficiently valuable to offset the 
loading costs imposed on all investors is ultimately an empirical question.  My intuition suggests 
it is not, but reasonable people could disagree. 
 
What we can say with some certainty is the following: diversified investors do not need securities 
misinformation insurance to spread securities misinformation risk, and non-diversified investors 
may not want it (before a loss). Thus, the case for securities misinformation insurance would be 
much stronger if it rested on something other than investor compensation and loss-spreading.  
The case would be much stronger if it rested on systematic benefits for the Canadian securities 
market, in other words on the positive externalities of the insurance. 
 
vi. Positive Externalities  
 
“Positive externalities” is the economic term for the benefits that a transaction provides to people 
other than the parties to that transaction.  The positive externalities of insurance can be quite 
substantial, as suggested by government support of insurance institutions around the world and by 
the fact that the generic term for government-supported retirement, disability, and health 
insurance is “social security.”   Would securities misinformation insurance create positive 
externalities?  If so, would those benefits outweigh the loading costs?   
 
If there are positive externalities, they should be reflected by increased demand – and therefore 
increased prices – for securities traded on the Canadian market.  Pushing in the other direction 
would be the drag on earnings from the loading costs of a new securities misinformation 
insurance program.  The loading costs are a certainty.  Increased demand for Canadian securities 
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a) Improved Compliance 
 
One possibility is that securities misinformation insurance would improve securities law 
compliance and reduce securities misinformation losses over time.  Whether this improved 
deterrence/compliance would be enough to offset the increased loading costs is an empirical 
question that cannot be answered in advance.36 Nevertheless, there are two reasons to believe that 
securities misinformation insurance might accomplish this goal.  First, a monopoly securities 
misinformation insurer would have significant institutional advantages over existing directors’ 
and officers’ liability insurers with regard to loss prevention and management.  Second, a 
securities misinformation insurer also could have institutional advantages over government and 
SRO enforcement agencies in the detection and prosecution of securities violations. 
 
Institutional advantages over D&O insurers. Ongoing research suggests that D&O insurers do 
not in fact perform as much governance as theory would suggest.37  In theory, a liability insurer 
can be expected to govern the behaviour of insurance applicants in several ways:  pricing on the 
basis of risk and thereby creating an incentive to reduce loss; conditioning insurance on 
compliance with loss prevention requirements; providing loss prevention advice that customers 
follow in order to reduce uninsured aspects of their loss; and providing loss management services, 
ex post, that draw on the insurers’ repeat player experience in the liability arena.  D&O insurers in 
fact provide very little of this governance, except through price, and even price-based governance 
is less developed than commonly believed.  The most parsimonious explanation for this situation 
is that corporate managers sufficiently value the autonomy that comes from purchasing D&O 
insurance as a pure, risk-spreading service that they are willing to pay more for that insurance 
notwithstanding the moral hazard.38  D&O insurance is sold in a competitive market with 
                                                 
36 It would be difficult to answer after the fact as well, if only because the recent adoption of the secondary 
market liability would make it difficult to determine whether the new liability or the new insurance is 
responsible for any observable change. 
37 See Tom Baker and Sean Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ and 
Officers’ Liability Insurer (working paper).  See also Tom Baker and Sean Griffith, Predicting Corporate 
Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Market (working paper) 
(describing D&O insurance market and D&O insurance underwriting process). Cf., Sean Griffith, 
Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ & 
Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 1147 (2006) (arguing that D&O insurance 
purchases and prices should be disclosed because of the governance information reflected in the price). 




.     
      
comparatively low entry costs, so an insurer that insisted on bundling unwanted governance 
features with the risk-spreading that buyers want would be quite unlikely to succeed. 
 
A monopoly securities misinformation insurer with a captive market would be a very different 
entity than a D&O insurer.  D&O insurers have little choice but to eschew the efforts that insurers 
take to control moral hazard in other liability insurance contexts.39  By contrast, a monopoly 
securities misinformation insurer would not be constrained by management’s preference for 
insurance that promotes management autonomy.  Subject only to the limits on underwriting 
authority imposed by the authorizing legislation or sponsoring organization, the securities 
misinformation insurer could require issuers to adopt any loss-prevention practices that it deemed 
beneficial.40  Subject to the same qualification, the insurer could adopt any loss-management 
practices that it deemed beneficial as well.  Moreover, because the securities misinformation 
insurer would be involved in every securities claim,41 the insurer could develop a comprehensive 
database of firm and claim characteristics that, in theory, would provide a more reliable basis for 
evaluating the effectiveness of different corporate governance measures than any single D&O 
insurer can develop at present.42
 
Institutional advantages over government and SRO enforcement agencies. While there would be 
legitimate concern that a securities misinformation insurer might resist the payment of claims in 
the first instance, once the insurer pays those claims it would have a significant incentive to 
recover the cost of those claims through subrogation against the responsible parties. This 
incentive distinguishes the securities misinformation insurer from government and SRO 
enforcement agencies, which are not empowered to seek and retain for the agencies themselves 
securities misinformation losses from the responsible parties.43   
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Whether a strong, non-accountable securities market regulator of this sort is desirable is beyond the 
scope of this report.  Because the conditions that cause securities misinformation losses are not well 
understood, I have concerns that the insurer might require practices that did not in fact prevent losses or 
that inappropriately interfered with issuers’ core business operations.  Because the insurer would hold a 
monopoly, there would not be a market check on such over-regulation. 
41 Except under the “excess” or “backstop” approach discussed in the design variables section. 
42 But see Baker & Griffith, Predicting Risk, supra note 37 (finding that D&O insurance underwriters focus 
on “deep governance” factors that are difficult to categorize across firms).  
43 Under paragraph 127(1)(10) of the Securities Act (Ontario), the OSC has the power to issue an order 
requiring a "person or company to disgorge to the Commission any amounts obtained as a result of non-
compliance" with Ontario securities law.  Where the disgorged monies end up is determined by subsection 
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b) Signalling of Quality 
 
A second potential benefit of securities misinformation insurance comes from the signalling 
function of that insurance, similar to the signalling function that economists attribute to generous 
product warranties. In the economics literature, consumers are understood to pay attention to 
warranties, not primarily because they actually intend to go through the complicated procedures 
needed to obtain the warranty benefit, but rather because the warranties signal the high quality of 
the product.44   Adopting a securities misinformation insurance program could signal that 
Canadian issuers are so confident of the transparency of the Canadian securities market that they 
are willing to buy insurance protecting investors for securities misinformation losses. On the 
other hand, as a member of the Task Force suggested, investors could regard the insurance as an 
indication that there is so much fraud in the Canadian market that the insurance is needed to 
induce people to invest.  The widespread advertising of good warranties in other markets suggests 
that consumers do not in fact regard warranties as a signal of poor quality.  Nevertheless, this 
comment usefully emphasizes the importance of framing and, thus, counsels the use of an 
appropriate advertising and public relations campaign in connection with the implementation of 
any securities misinformation insurance program. 
 
vii. A Cost-Benefit Summary   
 
As noted several times already, investor compensation and loss-spreading provide weak 
justifications for securities misinformation insurance.  The loading costs would certainly exceed 
                                                                                                                                                 
[of the Ontario government generally] money received by the Commission pursuant to an order under 
paragraph 9 or 10 of subsection 127(1) of this Act...or as a payment to settle enforcement proceedings 
commenced by the Commission, other than money, (a) to reimburse the Commission for costs incurred by 
it; or (b) that is designated under the terms of the order or settlement for allocation to or for the benefit of 
third parties ." [Emphasis added.]  Thank you to Jeffrey R. Elliott of Stikeman Elliott LLP for elucidation 
of this point. 
44 See Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product 
Quality, 24 J. L. & ECON. 461 (1981) (suggesting that this signalling function is particularly important for 
new products, a category that presumably would include old products with newly improved quality); 
Joshua L. Weiner, Are Warranties Accurate Signals of Product Reliability?, 12 J. CONSUMER RES. 245 
(1985).  Cf. Robert D. Cooter and Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 203 (2002) (suggesting that 
it would be efficient to assign warranty rights to a third party in situations involving consumer moral hazard 
and labelling this assignment “anti-insurance”).  It is worth noting that that private party civil securities 
liability functions as partial anti-insurance to the extent that class action firms “purchase” the warranty 
rights by agreeing to serve without ex ante compensation and then receive a significant part of the warranty 
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the loss-spreading benefits for an investor with a diversified portfolio of Canadian securities 
(because the insurance would simply move money from one part of that portfolio into another). 
The non-diversified investor has already revealed a preference against risk-spreading, and 
therefore may not value this mandatory, insurance-based diversification.  Promoting broader, 
market-based diversification would provide greater benefits to currently non-diversified investors, 
without the loading costs of an insurance program.  
 
Thus the case for securities misinformation insurance would be stronger if it could rest on 
systematic benefits for the Canadian securities market.  The potential systemic benefits are a) 
increased demand due to enhanced investor confidence, and b) reduced securities misinformation 
losses due to improved securities law compliance.   
 
Will the increased investor confidence offset the drag on earnings caused by the new insurance 
premiums?  Can a securities misinformation insurance program sufficiently improve securities 
compliance so that misinformation losses decline sufficiently over time to offset the loading 
costs?45 These are empirical questions that cannot be answered in advance.  Nevertheless, they do 
provide a way to think about the cost-benefit balance of any new securities misinformation 
insurance program. If the benefits of the new program are to exceed the costs, then the answer to 
one or both of these empirical questions must be “Yes”. Otherwise, the costs of the program will 
outweigh the benefits.  
  
                                                 
45 Note that this does not require that D&O and securities misinformation insurance premiums actually 
decline.  At present it seems very likely that many securities misinformation losses are not compensated 
and, thus, are not reflected in D&O insurance premiums.  An effective new securities misinformation 
insurance program would compensate a higher percentage of the eligible investors and, thus, have reporting 
effects.  The combined D&O and securities misinformation insurance premiums would likely be higher 
than D&O insurance premiums, alone, at present even if the new program reduces the overall amount of 




.     
      
6. Design Variables
 
A securities misinformation insurance program could take many forms.  For present purposes, the 
most important design variables are the following: 
 
• The definition of the misinformation event that triggers the right to insurance benefits, 
• Whether the program is primary or excess in relation to existing private-party civil 
liability, 
• The designation of beneficiaries and benefits,  
• The funding mechanism,  
• Claims procedures,  
• Rules regarding subrogation, and 
• Whether participation is to be mandatory. 
 
The subsections that follow briefly describe these design variables.  In order to avoid an 
extended, abstract discussion, Section 7 outlines three different securities misinformation 
insurance scenarios that provide the basis for a more concrete discussion. 
 
i. The Misinformation Event 
   
In this report “securities misinformation insurance” has been defined as insurance against 
securities misinformation loss, with “securities misinformation loss” defined simply as legally 
compensable investment loss from violation of Canadian securities laws.  Under this definition, 
the misinformation event would be a violation of the securities laws that causes legally 
compensable investment loss. Using existing securities laws to define the misinformation event 
serves the practical purposes identified earlier, most importantly isolating the effect that 
providing first-party liability insurance would have on the securities market and compliance. 
Although the program could be defined to cover a broader or narrower range of investment 
losses, consideration of this possibility should be left to securities law enforcement experts if and 
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ii. Primary or Excess 
  
The question here is whether an investor may recover first from the securities misinformation 
insurance program or whether the investor must first pursue a civil liability claim against the 
responsible parties.  Either way, the investor is entitled to compensation only when securities 
laws are violated and, thus, the securities misinformation insurance would be a form of liability 
insurance.  Unlike traditional, third-party liability insurance, however, the injured party would be 
the direct beneficiary of the insurance.  Thus, securities misinformation insurance would be a 
form of first-party liability insurance.   
 
The leading examples of first-party liability insurance are workers compensation insurance and 
under/uninsured motorists insurance.  For present purposes, the most significant difference 
between these two forms of first-party liability insurance lies in their relationship to other forms 
of compensation that are available to the beneficiary.  Workers compensation insurance is 
“primary” insurance for a work-related accident, meaning that the worker can collect directly 
from the workers compensation insurer without first having to pursue other avenues of redress.  
By contrast, under/uninsured motorists insurance is “excess” insurance for an automobile 
accident, meaning that the auto accident victim must first attempt to recover from the liability 
insurer of the responsible driver.  Only if the responsible driver does not have – or does not have 
enough – liability insurance, can the victim collect from his or her own under/uninsured motorists 
insurance. 
 
Securities misinformation insurance could be designed either way.  Under a primary insurance 
approach, a security holder could file a claim for benefits with the insurance program without first 
attempting to recover from the responsible parties and their insurers.  In that case, the securities 
misinformation insurance program presumably would have the right to seek indemnification from 
the responsible parties.  (This subrogation possibility is discussed in more detail below.)  Under 
an excess insurance approach, the security holder would first have to obtain whatever recovery it 
can from the responsible parties, and the insurance fund would compensate the investor only 
when the defendant does not have enough insurance or other assets.   
 
Under a primary insurance approach, the securities misinformation insurance program could well 
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This approach could offer substantial opportunities to improve securities law enforcement by 
creating a well-funded, subrogation-hungry securities litigation repeat player, but the loading 
costs would be correspondingly substantial.  Under an excess insurance approach, the insurance 
program could be more peripheral, and much less expensive, as long as potential defendants 
purchase adequate liability insurance, most importantly D&O insurance.46
 
iii. Beneficiaries   
 
The obvious beneficiaries of securities misinformation insurance are investors with legally 
compensable misinformation losses from Canadian securities violations. The most significant 
beneficiary-related design questions relate to possible distinctions among different subsets of this 
group. Moral hazard concerns counsel distinguishing between investors who have the ability to 
control or monitor securities law compliance from investors who do not.  Arguably, shareholders 
with control should not be covered at all, and shareholders with enhanced monitoring abilities 
should be covered at a lower level.47  
 
In one of the scenarios described below, the insurance applies only to securities traded on the 
TSX. This raises another important beneficiary-related design question:  How to treat investors 
with identical securities purchased on more than one exchange?  If the goal is to promote the use 
of the TSX, then a “last in, first out” decision rule (in which the most recently purchased 
securities are regarded as the ones that were first sold) would encourage buyers to trade on that 
exchange.  If the goal is to reward historical use of the exchange, then a “first in, first out” 
decision rule, (in which the most recently sold securities are regarded as the first purchased 
securities) would be preferable.  If the goal is to provide the maximum protection to investors, 
                                                 
46 The auto insurance situation illustrates the importance of this caveat.  Uninsured motorists insurance was 
first conceived as providing occasional protection for the unusual situation in which the driver could not be 
found or failed to buy insurance.  But under/uninsured motorists insurance has become one of the main 
institutions of auto accident compensation because so many drivers purchase very low limits of liability 
protection.  Note that this concern is addressed in Scenario 2 by suggesting that the insurance fund adopt a 
policy of not pursuing the private assets of individuals covered by a reasonable amount of insurance, except 
in situations involving aggravated fault.  This policy would encourage individual directors and officers to 
make sure that corporations purchase a reasonable amount of D&O insurance on their behalf. 
47 Of course this would require defining how much control and monitoring ability are enough:  A broader 
definition of “insiders”?  Shareholders with greater than X% of the outstanding shares?  Specific classes of 
investors, such as hedge funds?  If the program is intended to promote trading on the TSX, a member of the 
Task Force pointed out a countervailing concern:  investors who are excluded from the benefits would not 
be encouraged to trade inter-listed securities on the TSX.  These important beneficiary design details would 
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then the first securities disposed of should be considered the securities purchased on the specified 
exchange. 
 
iv. Benefits   
 
Securities misinformation insurance would compensate beneficiaries for all or part of their legally 
compensable securities misinformation losses.  The main benefits design question is “How much 
of the covered losses should be compensated?”  Even in the U.S., which appears to have more 
robust securities enforcement and compensation institutions than Canada, most investors who 
incur legally compensable misinformation losses probably are not compensated at all, and those 
who are compensated receive payments that make good only a portion of their losses.48  Thus, 
even a moderately successful securities misinformation insurance program would be likely to 
provide substantially more compensation than currently provided through civil liability.  
Moreover, because investor diversification already provides a low cost way to spread securities 
misinformation losses, deterrence and corrective justice objectives are more important from a 
public policy perspective than loss spreading.  For these reasons, and because of residual 
concerns about investor moral hazard, it would be advisable for investors to share in the loss.   
 
The investor share could be borne in the form of a deductible (meaning that the first $X of the 
loss are not compensated), a cap (meaning that losses per investor, per loss event beyond $Y are 
not compensated), coinsurance (meaning that the insurance covers only Z% of the loss), or some 
combination of these.  Caps represent a rough-and-ready way to address both moral hazard and 
fairness concerns. Perhaps for that reason they are common in other capital market protection 
programs, such as bank deposit insurance and insurance guaranty funds.  In light of the new 
Ontario secondary market liability, one possible approach would be to cap the securities 
misinformation insurance benefits at the level of the liability limits that are available to investors 
in the absence of a knowing violation.49  The investors’ right to pursue additional compensation 
                                                 
48 See Simmons & Ryan, supra note 17 (reporting that settlement amounts are a small percentage of 
damages).  To my knowledge there has not been research in the securities fraud arena that is analogous to 
the research done by RAND in the accident arena, comparing the rate of claiming to the rate of injuries.  
See, e.g., Carroll, Stephen and Allan Abrahamse, The Frequency of Excess Auto Personal Injury Claims, 3 
AM. L. AND ECON. REV. 228 (2001); Deborah R. Hensler et al, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES 
IN THE UNITED STATES (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1991).  That research shows that most people do not 
claim.  It would take a heroic assumption about the efficiency of existing securities class action litigation to 
conclude securities misinformation losses are different in this regard. 
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for a knowing violation might be transferred to the securities misinformation insurer, which 
would then split any recovery with investors, perhaps on a 50/50 basis.  This possibility is 
discussed further in the claims procedure section below and adopted as one of the key features of 
the first scenario. 
 
v. Funding    
 
Funding may well present the most complex design issues, starting with the question of who 
should pay the premiums for the insurance program.  Potential premium payers include issuers, 
sellers in the secondary market, buyers, and intermediaries.  In theory it is the investors who 
ultimately bear the costs in the form of reduced earnings, but different ways of collecting the 
premiums can affect how different classes of investors share those costs.   
 
Moral hazard, adverse selection, and fairness concerns all counsel linking premiums to risk. For 
example, if the frequency of trading affects securities misinformation risk (which seems likely 
since a buy-and-hold investor will be less likely to suffer a securities misinformation loss than an 
active trader50), then at least some portion of the premiums should be paid along with a trade so 
that the frequent traders internalize that increased risk.  Similarly, underwriters of directors and 
officers insurance in the U.S. believe that M&A activity and public offerings increase securities 
misinformation risk.51  For that reason, a securities misinformation insurance program might be 
designed to require the payment of additional premiums in connection with those (and other) risk-
increasing activities.  
 
As noted earlier, risk-based pricing is the main form of insurance as governance in the D&O 
market.  But risk-based pricing is less developed in that market than might be expected: the risk 
factors for securities misinformation losses are not well understood and very few factors have 
been quantified to any reliable extent.52   Thus, the pricing for a securities misinformation 
insurance program should be designed to allow for experimentation and learning. 
                                                 
50 As explained in the companion report of Professor Harry Panjer, the secondary market liability 
legislation provides a cause of action only to investors who traded during the misinformation period, so a 
buy-and-hold investor is much less likely to incur a legally compensable loss than a frequent trader. 
51 See Baker & Griffith, Predicting Risk, supra note 37. 
52 The primary quantifiable risk factors that D&O insurance underwriters presently use in the U.S. are 
market capitalization, industry group, and measures of share price volatility.  In addition, underwriters 
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In addition to providing an appropriate incentive to issuers, risk-based premiums have the 
potential to provide an interesting new source of information to the securities markets.53  While 
the premiums likely would be based on information that already is available to the market, the 
aggregation and transmission of that information in the form of a risk-based premium would be 
new.  This is one illustration of an important point: a securities misinformation insurance program 
could have unpredictable and unintended consequences. 
 
Other funding design questions include the following:  Who determines what the premiums will 
be?  How and when? Subject to what review?  How strongly committed should the program be to 
pre-funding?  What provision will there be for assessments in the event that losses exceed 
program reserves?  While important, these questions can be deferred until a decision to adopt a 
securities misinformation insurance program is made. 
 
vi. Claim Procedures   
 
Claims procedures will be very important, both because of the impact on loading costs and 
because the claims process would become part of the overall securities law enforcement 
mechanism, especially under a primary insurance model.  
 
Under any approach to securities misinformation insurance, there is an important conceptual 
distinction between the procedures for determining whether a misinformation event took place 
(i.e. that a Canadian securities violation caused at least some investment loss) and the procedures 
for determining who is entitled to what benefits as compensation for this securities 
misinformation loss.  The collective action problem resulting from dispersed ownership of 
securities presents a significant challenge to the design of the first procedure (which will be 
referred to as the Step 1 procedure). If a particular claimant bears the cost of the Step 1 
proceeding but can only benefit from the proceeding to the extent of her own harm, too few Step 
1 proceedings will be attempted. 
                                                                                                                                                 
prior claims activity, recent or upcoming M&A activity or public offerings, corporate governance, and their 
assessments of the character of the CFO and other top executives and the culture of the corporation.  Id.  
53 Cf. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statements Insurance Alternative 
to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 14 (2004) (predicting that disclosure of FSI insurance premiums 
would affect securities prices); Griffith, supra note 36 (predicting that disclosure of D&O insurance 
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Under an excess insurance model, the claims procedures would be comparatively straightforward.  
Step 1 would consist of a private-party civil liability action.  Step 2 would involve demonstrating 
to the securities misinformation insurer that Step 1 was complete and that the damages were not 
collectible.54  As can be readily seen, an excess insurance approach does not provide an 
independent solution to the collective action problem and, thus, would not improve securities law 
enforcement.  In effect, an excess insurance model simply guarantees the solvency of the 
responsible parties for purposes of paying securities misinformation claims (up to the limits of the 
insurance benefits). 
 
Under a primary insurance model, there is no comparatively obvious approach to claims 
procedures.  One approach might be to rely on a government or SRO enforcement agency to 
investigate and determine whether a securities law violation has occurred.  But this would do 
nothing for securities misinformation losses that were not investigated by enforcement agencies 
or that were resolved without admissions of fault by the responsible parties.  Thus, there must be 
some way for investors to bring the equivalent of a private-party civil liability action within the 
context of the insurance program.  If this new insurance-based claiming process simply shifts the 
forum of investors’ civil liability actions from the courts to the securities misinformation 
insurance claims process, however, it is hard to see what is gained, especially because the 
securities misinformation insurer would then turn to the courts to enforce its subrogation rights 
against the responsible parties.   
 
This latter point illustrates what might seem, at first, to be a fundamental incoherence in the very 
idea of primary, first-party liability insurance in situations in which the liable parties ordinarily 
have assets that are worth pursing.  Workers compensation insurance – a successful form of 
primary, first-party liability insurance – is easily distinguished, because the historic workers 
compensation bargain released employers from liability as long as they purchased workers 
compensation insurance for their employees.55  Thus the obvious responsible party (the 
                                                 
54 An important fine point concerns actions resolved by settlement.  To guard against ex post moral hazard, 
claimants should be required either to obtain the consent of the insurance fund before resolving a case by 
settlement or to demonstrate after the fact that the settlement was reasonable. 
55 David Moss, SOCIALIZING SECURITY: PROGRESSIVE-ERA ECONOMISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
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employer) cannot be pursued except in unusual circumstances.56  No-fault auto insurance – a 
form of primary insurance that replaces liability – also is easily distinguished.  No-fault insurance 
reflects a political judgment that compensating auto accident victims is more important than using 
civil liability to deter auto accidents (in part because of a belief that civil liability is not an 
effective deterrent in the personal auto context).   
 
The securities misinformation insurance context is very different.  Liable parties regularly have 
assets worth pursuing.57 Moreover, as suggested by the political judgment reflected in the new 
Ontario secondary market liability regime (most significantly the liability caps), deterrence is 
more important than compensation in the securities context.58  
 
If there were an existing, well-functioning liability system that adequately solved the collective 
action problem, then a first-party liability insurance program in fact would make little sense.  But 
if there is not, then a primary, first-party insurance program may help solve the collective action 
problem, provided that a) investors can more readily collect from the insurer than from the liable 
party, and b) the insurer then aggressively pursues subrogation actions against the liable parties.   
 
Building on the two-tiered approach of the new Ontario secondary market liability regime 
provides a significant opportunity for a primary securities misinformation insurance program to 
improve on liability alone.  Recall that the new Ontario legislation has generous, investor-friendly 
damages rules, but limits the liability of potential defendants unless investors meet what appears 
to be a difficult “knowing violation” test.59  Thus, there will in some instances be a substantial 
gap between the damages that a defendant caused and the liability that the defendant is obligated 
to pay, absent proof of a knowing violation.   
 
Similar to the underlying liability regime, a primary securities misinformation insurance program 
could be structured to pay benefits up to the “limited-fault” liability caps upon satisfactory proof 
of a violation (perhaps under the “likely to succeed” standard used for preliminary injunctions in 
the U.S.), in return for receiving from the investors an assignment of their claims against the 
                                                 
56 See Arthur Larson, ed., LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION (Matthew Benson 2001). 
57 A member of the Task Force commented that defendants often do not have sufficient insurance or other 
assets in the Canadian securities fraud context.  If so, that strengthens to some degree the compensation 
justification for securities misinformation insurance (subject to the diversification discussion earlier). 
58 Braithwaite & Ciardullo supra note 1. 
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potentially responsible parties.  The assignment would grant to the securities misinformation 
insurer the right to receive complete compensation for the benefits that it provided, plus the right 
to proceed on behalf of the investors against the defendants for additional damages under the 
uncapped, knowing violation standard, with the securities misinformation insurer to receive an 
appropriate percentage of any additional recovery as compensation (50%?) for taking the risk and 
funding the action.60 Absent this insurance arrangement, an investor cannot take the 
comparatively sure thing – the “limited-fault” damages – while at the same time preserving the 
ability to collect on the long-shot, uncapped, knowing violation damages.61 Instead, the investor 
faces a choice between settling quickly for the limited-fault capped amount or waiting for the 
resolution of a longer, more costly knowing violation litigation.  The two-tiered payment and 
assignment approach sketched here has the potential to improve deterrence, in effect by creating 




Subrogation is the legal term given to the right of an insurer to step into the shoes of a beneficiary 
in order to recoup from other liable parties what the insurer has paid to, or on behalf of, the 
beneficiary.  For example, health insurers in the U.S. commonly obtain reimbursement from 
automobile insurance companies for the cost of treatment for medical injuries from auto 
accidents.  Similarly, a workers compensation insurer can obtain reimbursement from an auto 
insurer for benefits paid in a work-related auto accident or from a manufacturer for benefits paid 
                                                 
60 A very helpful discussion with Professor Jill Fisch provided the germ of this idea. 
61 The closest available settlement device is the high/low agreement, which is common in personal injury 
litigation.  Under a high/low agreement the plaintiff and defendant agree to go to trial but they limit their 
exposure by agreeing that, no matter what the jury does, the plaintiff gets at least the low amount and the 
defendant will not have to pay more than the high amount.  Securities actions go to trial far less frequently 
than personal injury actions, and there are no reports of high/low settlements (perhaps because securities 
class action settlements require judicial approval; it is hard to imagine a judge approving a settlement that 
contemplated a trial).  The securities misinformation insurance payment and assignment approach just 
described provides plaintiffs with all the security of a high/low agreement, with less sacrifice, and more 
quickly. 
62 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 167 (1997); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller , Auctioning Class Action and Derivative 
Suits: a Rejoinder, 87 NW. L. REV. 458 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ 
Attorney’s Role in Class Actions and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for 
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class 
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for a work-related products liability injury.63  Subrogation would be a major feature of a 
securities misinformation insurance program only if the program provides primary insurance.  
(With an excess approach, the plaintiffs presumably will already have recovered from the 
responsible parties, thus there will in the ordinary case be no need for subrogation).   
 
The obvious potential targets for subrogation actions include officers and directors, accountants 
and other gatekeepers, and the issuer itself.  The arguments for and against subrogation are 
similar to the arguments for and against liability in the first instance.  The main difference is that 
there are no compensation-based justifications for subrogation.64 In addition, the presence of 
securities misinformation insurance reduces shareholders’ incentive to prevent misinformation 
loss, making the deterrence and corrective justice arguments for subrogation even stronger than 
those for liability in the first instance. 
  
In many circumstances, the main problem with subrogation is that it increases loading costs due 
to the potential for double litigation (or even triple litigation in the event of a dispute over 
whether the liability insurance covers a particular subrogation action).  Ordinarily, these 
additional loading costs provide further reason to doubt the compensation and loss spreading 
rationale for any new first-party liability insurance, especially if the victims have other ways of 
spreading their losses.   Once again, however, the two-tiered nature of the new Ontario secondary 
market liability provides an opening to argue, first, that the additional costs will be less than 
might seem (because the initial decision to pay the limited liability level of benefits can be made 
in summary fashion, without extensive fact-finding) and, second, that these additional costs will 
produce substantial deterrence benefits.  
 
vii. Participation Requirements   
 
Most forms of capital markets insurance are mandatory, whether as a matter of law or practice.  
Bank deposit insurance, pension guarantee funds, broker/dealer protection funds, and insurance 
guarantee funds are not optional for the institutions for which they exist.   
                                                 
63 For a discussion of how subrogation works in practice in the U.S. tort context, see Tom Baker, Blood 
Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 275, 301 et 
seq. (2001). 
64 In other contexts, subrogation may promote compensation by reducing the cost of first party insurance 
and, thus, allowing more people to purchase that insurance. Here, subrogation would shift costs to D&O 
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Securities misinformation insurance could be mandated by provincial law (like insurance and 
pension guarantee funds), federal law (like bank deposit insurance), or by membership 
requirements in a self-regulatory organization (like investor protection funds). Mandatory 
participation requirements could make the securities misinformation insurance fund a very 
significant gatekeeper.  Provided that the fund engages in risk-based underwriting, there 
presumably will be some potential securities issuers that the fund decides are too risky to insure at 
a price the issuer is able to pay, with the result that potential issuer will have to raise capital in 
some other way.  From a loss-prevention perspective, this gatekeeper function is a good thing, but 
there may be a political pushback, another potential unintended consequence of securities 
misinformation insurance. 
 
Whether mandatory participation is necessary to prevent adverse selection is an empirical 
question.  Risk-based pricing would reduce the adverse selection concern.  If investors really 
value securities misinformation insurance, issuers would use the insurance coverage as a selling 
point (much as banks in the U.S. now use “FDIC insured” as a selling point for certificates of 
deposit) and, thus, may be willing to participate in a voluntary system.  On the other hand, if the 
goal of the insurance is to improve securities enforcement, then participation in the program may 
increase the chance that a securities violation would be detected.  While that might reduce 
issuers’ initial interest in the product, it would also increase the quality signal provided by the 
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7. Scenarios 
 
This Section describes three securities misinformation insurance scenarios. The objective is to 
provide concrete examples that will facilitate analysis of the potential costs and benefits of 
securities misinformation insurance, as well as the comparative advantages of different 
approaches to the design variables just discussed. In the first scenario a new single-purpose 
organization modeled on the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation administers the primary 
securities misinformation insurance program.  In the second scenario a new industry-supported 
Canadian Securities Fraud Protection Fund administers a securities misinformation insurance 
program that applies to securities traded on the TSX.   In the third scenario private market 
insurers provide the insurance in response to demand stimulated by a new disclosure requirement.     
 
i. Government-provided primary insurance: CIIC 
 
This first scenario is a more fully developed, Canadian version of an insurance program briefly 
suggested in the conclusion of David Skeel’s Icarus in the Boardroom (2005).65  In this first 
scenario, a new Crown corporation modeled on the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation – the 
Canadian Investor Insurance Corporation (CIIC) – provides the securities misinformation 
insurance.  The CIIC insurance benefits are primary, meaning that investors can collect benefits 
from the CIIC without first having to bring private actions against securities violators. 
 
Beneficiaries:  All securities holders who demonstrate through specified claims 
procedures that they have suffered a legally compensable investment loss from a 
Canadian securities law violation.  (N.B. The moral hazard of providing insurance to 
influential persons and other insiders is addressed through Step 2 of the claims procedure 
sketched below.) 
 
                                                 
65 Sean Griffith, Daedelean Tinkering, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1247 (2006) (reviewing David Skeel, IACARUS 
IN THE BOARDROOM (Oxford U. P. 2005), and criticizing Skeel’s investor protection insurance idea on 
diversification grounds similar to those discussed in section 5.5 of this report).  Almost all of the 





.     
      
Benefits:  The legally compensable damages available under private-party civil liability 
actions, subject to the limited fault liability caps of the Ontario secondary market liability 
legislation.  
 
Funding:  The CIIC is funded in three ways, none of which impose any financial burden 
on the general revenues of the government:   
 
1. All investors in Canadian securities traded in Canadian markets pay a small per-
trade fee (proportional to the value of the trade), collected by securities dealers.66 
(The purpose of the per-trade fee is to reflect the increased exposure to securities 
misinformation losses from trading.)  
 
2. Issuers of Canadian securities will pay annual, risk-based premiums set by CIIC 
using best actuarial practices, with a special emphasis on risk factors that are 
within the control of issuers.  (The likely initial risk factors are those presently 
used in the private D&O insurance market.)   
 
3. If securities misinformation losses reduce the reserves of the CIIC below a target 
level, issuers may be assessed additional amounts (similar to that for the 
Canadian life insurance guaranty fund, Assuris).  CIIC would have authority to 
borrow funds (secured by future assessments) to cover operational shortfalls. 
 
Claim procedures:   
 
Step 1:  Any affected investor may demonstrate that a Canadian securities violation 
has caused an investment loss in one of two ways: 
 
1. By providing proof of an enforcement proceeding alleging that fact 
and resolved through adjudication or a settlement with an admission 
of fault; or  
                                                 
66 Note that this could discourage trading on Canadian exchanges for inter-listed securities.  An alternative 
would be to require a per trade fee for a Canadian issued security no matter where it is traded.  Whether 
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2. By initiating a private investor proceeding with the CIIC.  CIIC will 
establish the procedures and proof requirements for the private 
investor proceeding through a consultative process with the SROs 
and experts in the fields of securities law, administrative and civil 
procedure, and insurance.  For transactions subject to the Ontario 
secondary market liability legislation, this procedure will be 
designed to facilitate prompt and inexpensive proof of the limited-
fault liability established in that legislation.  One approach would be 
to establish a “likely to succeed on the merits at trial” standard as the 
trigger for payment of the insurance benefits.67  
 
Step 2:  Once CIIC determines that a Canadian securities law violation has 
caused a legally compensable investment loss, CIIC will use available 
databases to identify investors who suffered legally compensable loss 
and to make a preliminary determination of the amount of their loss. 
CIIC will then provide that information to each investor, explaining the 
benefits to which the investor appears to be entitled and providing the 
opportunity for an appeal of the initial determination.  Subject to an 
administrative appeal procedure, payments will be made accordingly.   
Any payments to the issuer, directors or officers of the issuer, controlling 
shareholders or other potential subjects of a subrogation proceeding will 
be placed in escrow pending a decision regarding subrogation.  A 
decision by the CIIC to commence a subrogation proceeding against an 
individual or entity will result in the forfeiture of any CIIC benefits for 
which the individual or entity might otherwise have been entitled in 
connection with the loss to which the subrogation proceeding relates.68
                                                 
67 Although the use of this standard would likely result in the CIIC paying benefits in some cases in which 
it was not able to recover those benefits from the responsible parties, the CIIC should be able to fund those 
benefits through the recoveries it obtains for knowing violations in other cases. 
68 In effect, the subrogation action would create a non-rebuttable presumption of liability to the extent of 
any CIIC benefits that would otherwise be due.   An alternative approach suggested by one Task Force 
member would be to place the benefits in an escrow fund that would be released if the subrogation action 
was not successful.  I prefer the approach in the main text because of the moral hazard involved in 
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Subrogation:   As a condition of making payments under the fund, CIIC will obtain the 
broadest possible subrogation rights from all claimants.  CIIC will bring subrogation 
actions when appropriate in the exercise of its discretion.  Subrogation to the extent of the 
CIIC benefits will almost always be appropriate.  In addition, the CIIC will have the 
authority to seek compensation for additional damages to investors, such compensation to 
be shared by the CIIC and the investors on a 50/50 basis after deducting (a) all of the 
CIIC’s costs of collection and (b) an administrative fee that will cover the expenses 
incurred in processing the CIIC benefits.69
 
Participation requirements:  All issuers subject to Canadian securities law are required to 
pay insurance premiums.  All investment dealers and exchanges are required to ensure 
that the per-trade fee is paid. 
 
One member of the Task Force suggested consideration of an opt-out for institutional investors, 
in effect allowing them to make the decision whether to diversify against securities 
misinformation risk.  As a practical matter, an-opt out would work only for per-trade fees, not for 
premiums paid by issuers (because the institutional investor would bear the proportional cost of 
any issuer paid fees through reduced earnings).  Thus, for an opt-out option to be real, the primary 
funding for the program would have to be per trade fees.  To avoid strategic behaviour in an opt-
out system, an opt-out made in connection with any trade should be regarded as a complete opt-
out for that investor with regard to the securities of that issuer. 
 
Role of private market insurers:  Private market insurers are not involved in the provision 
of securities misinformation insurance.  Because the underlying liability regime is 
maintained, and subrogation encouraged, the market for D&O insurance remains. 
 
ii. Industry-Provided Excess Insurance: SFPF 
 
In this scenario, the Toronto Stock Exchange mandates that issuers whose securities trade on the 
exchange must participate in a new securities misinformation insurance program to be called the 
Canadian Securities Fraud Protection Fund.  (Alternatively, the program could be made a part of 
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the existing Canadian Investor Protection Fund, which presently protects investors from the 
insolvency of their investment dealers).  The new program would be excess to civil liability, 
meaning that the investors would first have to bring a private-party civil action against the 
responsible parties.  
 
Beneficiaries:  All investors who have successfully concluded a Canadian private-party 
civil liability action relating to securities purchased on the Toronto Securities Exchange 
but have been unable to collect all their legally compensable damages. 
 
Benefits:  Same as for CIIC in Scenario 1 above, with three important differences: 
 
• The SFPF benefits are excess to a civil liability recovery;   
• The benefits are limited to losses relating to securities traded on the TSX;70  
• In the event that the investors have established liability beyond the limited 
fault liability of the Ontario secondary market liability legislation, the total 
benefits to all issuers will be capped at 10% of the market capitalization of 
the issuer at the time of the misinformation event.71  
 
For investors who purchased securities on more than one exchange, the first shares sold during 
the misinformation period will be regarded as the shares purchased on the TSX. 
 
Funding:  Issuers pay risk-based premiums set by the SFPF using best actuarial 
practices.72  (The most important risk factor is likely to be credit risk.)  If securities 
misinformation losses reduce the reserves of the SFPF below a target level, issuers may 
be assessed additional amounts (similar to that for the Canadian life insurance guarantee 
                                                 
70 A Task Force member commented that, if benefits were limited to shares traded on the TSX, the 
fiduciary obligations of institutional investors would require them to trade inter-listed securities on the TSX 
so that their participants would receive the benefit of the insurance.  If trading on another change is less 
costly and if the institutional investor holds a sufficiently diversified portfolio, I would expect that the 
contrary argument would be made.  Namely, the institutional investor would argue that it was already 
protecting its participants from securities misinformation (and all other firm-specific losses) by holding a 
diversified portfolio and, therefore, the prudent place to purchase the securities would be on the cheaper 
exchange. 
71 This (arbitrary) 10% cap comes from doubling the 5% cap in the new Ontario secondary market 
legislation. 
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fund, Assuris).  The SFPF has authority to borrow funds (secured by future assessments) 




Step 1:  Claimants successfully conclude a private civil liability action.  As a 
condition of eligibility for SFPF benefits, civil liability actions resolved 
through settlement must be approved by court order entered with the 
consent of the SFPF.73
 
Step 2: Claimants must demonstrate: 
• Satisfactory completion of Step 1; 
• Legally compensable damages relating to trades on TSX; 
• These damages have not been fully compensated; 
• All applicable liability insurance has been exhausted and  
o Each corporate defendant has paid (or been assessed) its 
liabilities in full or become insolvent or otherwise 
unavailable 
o Each individual defendant who has not paid his or her 
liabilities in full has paid (or been assessed) amounts that are 
reasonable in light of the gravity of the violation, the 
individual’s participation, and the adequacy of the limits of 
insurance protecting the individual.74 
 
                                                 
73 This consent requirement is intended to prevent claimants and defendants from structuring settlements to 
take advantage of the SFPF by, for example, shifting the D&O money and other assets to claimants who 
did not trade on the TSX.  Consider whether the SFPF might in an appropriate case accept a partial 
settlement and assignment of the right to proceed against the non-settling defendants in return for payment 
of the securities misinformation insurance benefits.  If so, this might allow the SFPF to fill a broader 
enforcement role than might be expected given the excess nature of the insurance protection. 
74  This final factor maintains the incentive to insure. This standard is similar to the norm in personal injury 
practice, in which plaintiffs typically do not attempt to collect from defendants’ personal assets except in 
the case of aggravated fault or failure to purchase adequate insurance.  See Baker, Tort Law in Action, 
supra note 63.  Routinely collecting from the assets of individual defendants in securities litigation would 
represent a dramatic departure from current practice.  The norms in settlement of securities fraud actions 
appears to require contribution from individual defendants only when the defendant was actively engaged 
in and profited from the fraud, or, more rarely, when the magnitude of the fraud was extreme.  See Black et 
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Appeal:  In the event that a claimant is not satisfied with the recovery from the 
SFPF, the claimant may bring an action in the Toronto Divisional Court, 
which will review the decision for abuse of discretion.  All actions 
relating to a single loss event will be consolidated. 
 
Subrogation:   As a condition of making payments under the fund, SFPF will obtain the 
broadest possible subrogation rights from all claimants.  SFPF will bring subrogation 
actions (i.e. civil liability actions in the names of the investors it compensated) when 
appropriate in the exercise of its discretion.  Because this is an excess approach, 
subrogation typically will be used only to collect damages assessed in the private-party 
civil litigation.  
 
Participation requirements: All issuers whose securities trade on the TSX are required to 
pay premiums.75
 
Role of private market insurers:  Private market insurers are not involved in the provision 
of securities misinformation insurance.  Private market insurers will continue to provide 
D&O and professional liability insurance.  As noted, the claims process will be structured 
to maintain the incentive for individuals and entities to purchase D&O and professional 
liability insurance. 
 
iii. Private Market Insurance: SPI 
 
In this scenario, one or more provincial legislatures enact legislation that requires securities 
issuers to obtain securities protection insurance from a licensed insurance company or to disclose 
the decision not to purchase such insurance in every communication with a holder or potential 
purchaser of a security that it has issued.  (Alternatively, the TSX adopts the same disclosure 
requirement for securities traded on the TSX.)  The securities protection insurance is excess first-
party liability insurance.   
 
                                                 
75 The opt-out possibility discussed in connection with the CIIC scenario could be considered in this 
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Described in the language of the insurance trade, the new securities protection insurance would 
function as if it were a Difference In Conditions (DIC) policy that is excess to the liability 
insurance policies of all the potential defendants to a private-party civil liability action relating to 
an issuer that purchased the insurance.  The securities protection insurance would drop down in 
the event that any of this liability insurance is uncollectible for any reason (including the 
application of any exclusions) and it would be available in the event of exhaustion of the liability 
insurance.   
 
This is broader coverage than provided in excess liability insurance policies presently on the 
market.  None of the typical exclusions in D&O or professional liability insurance policies would 
apply (e.g., intentional harm), and it is a real question whether the insurer should be permitted to 
rescind the policy because of fraud in the application. The securities protection insurance would 
differ from a true excess DIC policy, however, in that the insurer would be permitted to subrogate 
against any or all of the defendants in the securities claim.  Thus, as long as the entity that 
purchases the policy is sufficiently solvent, a defrauded insurer should be able to be made whole 
through subrogation.  Thus, credit risk would be an extremely important aspect of the 
underwriting decision, if any insurer were to decide to offer the insurance. 
 
Beneficiaries:  Investors who have successfully concluded a Canadian private-party civil 
liability action relating to securities of an issuer that purchased the insurance, but have 
been unable to collect all their legally compensable damages.  
 
Benefits:   The legislation (or TSX rule) would specify a minimum benefit level to 
qualify as investor protection insurance.  Issuers would be free to purchase and advertise 
that they have purchased higher levels of protection.  For purposes of discussion, assume 
that the minimum benefit is 75% of legally compensable securities misinformation losses 
with a cap of $250,000 per investor per loss event.76
                                                 
76 Obviously this cap would make the insurance unattractive to institutional investors.  The program could 
be designed with a larger cap, but this would make the program even less attractive to insurance companies 
than it already is.  One alternative would be a larger per investor cap combined with an aggregate limit on 
the policy.  Issuers would be free to purchase excess layers of insurance that would increase the aggregate 
limit.  Based on discussions at the Roundtable and my own experience with D&O insurers I doubt that 
liability insurers would have an appetite for this kind of insurance, unless it were backed by some form of 
government or industry-sponsored reinsurance (which, presumably, could have the ability to assess issuers 
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Premiums: Issuers will pay premiums.  The market will set prices.  Existing provincial 
legislation may give insurance regulators some authority to review rates, but that 
authority is unlikely to be exercised.  
 
Claim procedures:   
 
Step 1:  Claimants must successfully conclude a private civil liability action.  To 
be eligible for compensation, claims resolved through settlement must be 
approved by court order entered after the insurer was provided the 
opportunity to be heard. 
 
Step 2: Claimants must demonstrate: 
• Satisfactory completion of Step 1; 
• Legally compensable damages relating to securities of an issuer that 
purchased the insurance; 
• These damages have not been fully compensated; 
• All applicable liability insurance has been exhausted and  
o Each corporate defendant has paid (or been assessed) its 
liabilities in full or become insolvent or otherwise 
unavailable 
o Each individual defendant who has not paid his or her 
liabilities in full has paid (or been assessed) amounts that are 
reasonable in light of the gravity of the violation, the 
individual’s participation, and the adequacy of the limits of 
insurance protecting the individual. 
• If the action was resolved through settlement, that the settlement was 
reasonable. 
 
Appeal:  In the event that a claimant is not satisfied with the recovery from the 
securities misinformation insurer, the claimant may bring a breach of 
contract action against the insurer.  All actions from a single loss event 
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Subrogation:  Subrogation rights are determined by contract.  Based on current practice in 
other private market insurance contexts, the investor protection insurance contracts are 
likely to include subrogation provisions.  As with the SFPF scenario, subrogation will be 
used to collect damages assessed in the underlying private-party civil litigation.  In 
addition, subrogation would be permitted against the purchasing issuer in the event of 
fraud in the application. 
 
Participation requirements:  Participation is voluntary, but encouraged through the 
requirement that issuers regularly disclose the absence of such insurance.  While 
voluntary participation could lead to adverse selection, insurers’ freedom to price on the 
basis of risk will mitigate adverse selection.  Moreover, if investors respond negatively to 
disclosures regarding the absence of insurance, low-risk issuers are likely to purchase the 
insurance even if they have reason to believe that their premiums will subsidize high-risk 
issuers and that buying the insurance increases the probability that a securities violation 
will be detected. 
 
Role of private market insurers:  This is a private market approach. Whether insurers 
would be willing to offer this insurance is an open question.  The representatives of the 
insurance industry present at the Roundtable were sceptical of their ability to price this 
risk and issuers’ interest in voluntarily paying for such insurance. 
 
iv. Comparison and Discussion 
 
This section discusses the differences among these scenarios in terms of the design variables 
introduced in Part C, above.  Before beginning that discussion, however, it is important to point 
out that government sponsorship does not necessarily make the government a guarantor of the 
insurance benefits (as the CIIC scenario illustrates and as the experience of the Canadian Deposit 
Insurance Corporation demonstrates77).  Government sponsorship need not imply a trade-off 
between support for investors on the one hand and support for the environment, the 
                                                 
77 See generally, A. Warren Moysey, Deposit Insurance and Other Compensation Arrangements, Research 
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disadvantaged, or any other potentially more important policy objective on the other. One 
obvious advantage of federal government sponsorship is the greater reach of federal authority 
and, possibly, greater investor confidence in the security of a government sponsored fund.  If the 
TSX or other industry organization sponsors the insurance program, investors may be concerned 
that TSX members will pressure the organization to keep the premiums low, leading to under-
funding.  
 
a) The Misinformation Event   
 
All three scenarios defined the misinformation event identically, by reference to Canadian 
securities law. 
 
b) Primary or Excess   
 
This design variable presents one of the most important differences among the scenarios.  The 
first scenario outlined a primary insurance approach.  The second two scenarios outlined excess 
insurance approaches.  Although the first scenario linked government sponsorship with a primary 
insurance approach, this link is not inevitable. The government could sponsor an insurance fund 
that paid on an excess basis; the TSX could sponsor an insurance fund that paid on a primary 
basis; and private market insurers could in theory offer either kind of insurance.   
 
How to make the primary vs. excess choice depends on the securities law enforcement role that is 
imagined for the insurance program.  Under an excess approach, the program in effect provides a 
limited guarantee of the solvency of potential defendants in securities actions and does not play 
an important enforcement role.  Under a primary approach, the program could become a major 
force in securities law enforcement.  
 
c) Benefits and Beneficiaries    
 
All three scenarios used Canadian securities law to define the beneficiaries and the compensation 
that is available to investors.  In addition, each of the scenarios also set a cap on the amount of 
compensation that an investor could receive from the insurance program for any single loss, even 
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benefits that would be paid for any single misinformation loss at the limited-fault liability limits 
established in the new Ontario secondary market liability legislation.  (Significantly, this scenario 
established a two-tiered payment and assignment procedure in which investors authorized the 
insurance fund to obtain additional damages from the responsible defendants on their behalf.)  
The second scenario capped the total insurance benefits that would be paid for any single loss at 
10% of the market cap of the issuer (determined at the time of the misinformation event), and the 
third scenario capped the benefits for any single investor at the smaller of $250,000 or 75% of the 
legally compensable losses.  
 
There is no insurance-based reason why either of these latter caps would be optimal.  Setting an 
optimal cap would require deeper knowledge of the securities markets than possessed by the 
author of this report.  The point here is simply to suggest that some kind of cap is needed to 
address insurance moral hazard concerns (i.e. to maintain the incentive of larger investors to 
monitor securities law compliance efforts).  In addition, a cap facilitates more reliable pricing of 




Reflecting the political judgment of the participants at the Roundtable, none of the scenarios 
involves any government guarantees or the use of any government money.  All three scenarios 
assume that the issuers whose securities are covered by the insurance will pay risk-based 
premiums.  The differences among the scenarios concern the presence or absence of per-trade 
fees and the ability of the insurer to require issuers to pay post-loss assessments in the event that 
losses consume the reserves of the insurance fund.   
 
The funding design in each of the scenarios reflects the incentives of the institutions involved.  
The government-sponsored CIIC scenario has both per trade fees and the possibility of post-loss 
assessments.  The TSX-sponsored SFPF scenario has the possibility of post-loss assessments but 
no per-trade fees.  And the private market approach has no per-trade fees and no possibility of 
post-loss assessments. 
 
There are no per-trade fees in the TSX-sponsored SFPF approach because a per-trade fee would 
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in the private market approach because of the administrative complexity involved in collecting 
the fees on behalf of multiple private market insurers.  There are no post-loss assessments in the 
private market approach because issuers can choose whether to purchase the insurance or not, and 
it seems most likely that an issuer would prefer a fixed premium based on risks that are relatively 
within its knowledge and control rather than an uncertain premium that would be based on risks 
that are not within its knowledge or control (i.e. the behaviour of other issuers). 
 
e) Claims Procedures  
 
The most significant difference in the claims procedures in the scenarios follows from the 
primary vs. excess decision.  With an excess approach, the claims procedures are comparatively 
obvious.  The two challenges addressed in the scenarios are (1) maintaining potential defendants’ 
incentive to purchase liability insurance (addressed through the “reasonable insurance” rule 
discussed in the subrogation section of the second scenario) and (2) preventing the parties to the 
civil liability action from engaging in litigation and settlement tactics that take unfair advantage 
of the securities misinformation fund (addressed by the “reasonable settlement” rule discussed in 
the claims procedures section of the second and third scenarios).78
 
With a primary insurance approach the claim-processing design challenges are more substantial.  
The best justification for a primary insurance approach is improving securities law enforcement.  
Thus, the challenge is to design a claims procedure that substantially improves on the existing 
private-party civil liability without over-compensating investors (and therefore increasing the 
loading costs of the insurance and making investors indifferent to the securities compliance levels 
of issuers).  How to do this lies beyond the expertise of an insurance expert and, thus, the CIIC 
scenario (Scenario 1) observed that “CIIC will establish the procedures and proof requirements 
for the private investor proceeding through a consultative process with the SROs and experts in 
                                                 
78 Note that the claims procedures described in the two excess scenarios differ as follows:   
• In the TSX-sponsored scenario (Scenario 2), the consent of the Fund to the settlement of the 
underlying civil liability action is a condition precedent to eligibility for Fund benefits, and the 
appeal from the Fund determination of the individual benefit amounts is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard.   
• By contrast, in the private market scenario (Scenario 3), consent of the securities protection insurer 
to settlement of the underlying action is not a condition precedent; instead the requirement is that 
the settlement be reasonable.  And the appeal from the insurer’s determination of the individual 
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the fields of securities law, administrative and civil procedure, and insurance.”  The two-tiered 
payment and assignment approach sketched in this report provides one potentially promising 
approach to designing a primary securities market insurance program to improve the deterrence 
function of securities liability.      
 
f) Subrogation.   
 
The only differences among the scenarios with regard to subrogation follow from the primary vs. 
excess decision.  Subrogation would be a routine, crucial part of a primary insurance approach.  
In an excess approach, subrogation would simply be a tool for collecting damages assessed in a 
private-party civil liability action. 
 
g) Participation Requirements.    
 
The participation requirements in the scenarios follow from the underlying goal of the insurance 
program in question.  Presumably, the goal of a federally sponsored program would be to increase 
the demand for Canadian securities generally; thus all Canadian issuers would be required to 
participate.79  The goal of the TSX would be to increase the demand for trading on the TSX, thus 
only issuers that trade on the TSX would be required to participate.  The goal of the private 
market approach would be to provide the opportunity for issuers to signal the quality of their 
corporate governance and for investors to make decisions on the basis of that signal; thus, 
participation would be voluntary.  As discussed in the first scenario, it would be possible to 
design a “mandatory” program to allow an institutional investor to opt out, but, if the opt-out 
option is to be real, a program with an opt-out option would have to be funded primarily by per-
trade fees.  Allowing opt-outs would reduce the objection that the securities misinformation 
insurance program would impose unnecessary loading costs on already diversified investors.  But 
it would also reduce the likelihood that the insurance program would in fact improve compliance.   
 
h) The Role of Private Market Insurers  
 
                                                 
79 As one Task Force member commented, an alternative goal would be to encourage trading on specified 
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Third-party liability insurance would remain a vibrant insurance market in all three scenarios.  
Only the third scenario relies on the private market to provide the new securities misinformation 
insurance.  In theory the private market would already be providing that insurance if investors 
were willing to pay for it.  But as the underinsured motorists insurance example demonstrates, it 
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8. Conclusion 
 
This report has explored the following topics:   
 
• How securities misinformation risks are addressed in the absence of securities 
misinformation insurance (investor diversification, civil liability and related liability 
insurance, government and SRO enforcement); 
• The various forms that a new securities misinformation insurance program could take; 
and 
• The kinds of tradeoffs involved in making choices about the main design variables (most 
significantly the sponsoring organization, whether to provide primary or excess benefits, 
benefit caps, and claims procedures). 
 
In concluding, the report returns to the cost-benefit analysis left off in the discussion of insurance 
issues in Section 5, vii.  Although that analysis was purely conceptual, it demonstrated that the 
costs of any new Canadian securities misinformation insurance would outweigh the loss-
spreading benefits for investors who hold a diversified portfolio of Canadian securities.  For those 
investors, securities misinformation insurance would simply provide an expensive way to move 
money from one pocket to another. 
 
Among investors who do not hold a diversified portfolio of Canadian securities, the new 
insurance would provide loss-spreading benefits to those lucky enough to be able to link their 
investment losses to Canadian securities violations.  But it is doubtful whether, even for non-
diversified investors as a whole, the loss-spreading benefits are sufficient to justify the loading 
costs imposed on the market as a whole, especially as compared to the more broadly beneficial – 
and less expensive – alternative of promoting retirement and other investment programs that 
increase investor diversification as a whole.   
 
Is singling out securities misinformation losses for expensive, insurance-based, mandatory 
diversification really the best way to protect the non-diversified investor? Encouraging, perhaps 
even requiring, retail investors to diversify their investments seems likely to provide more 
substantial benefits at lower cost.  Not even the most expensive mutual fund eats up 20 to 30% of 




.     
      
insurance premiums paid indirectly by all but the relatively few investors lucky enough to: a) 
have their investments disproportionately invested in securities affected by securities violations, 
and b) have traded in the right (or should it be wrong?) direction during the misinformation 
period.  Indeed, the average non-diversified, buy-and-hold investor will not derive much benefit 
from securities misinformation insurance, since a buy-and-hold investor is less likely to be 
harmed by securities misinformation than a more frequent trader.   
 
On the other hand, because of the importance of accurate information to the functioning of the 
securities markets, it is possible that non-diversified, “merit” investors would value a 
diversification program narrowly targeted at securities misinformation risk.  A securities 
misinformation insurance program with an easy opt-out would allow such investors to obtain that 
protection without imposing the resulting loading costs on diversified investors.  On the other 
hand, easy opt-out would undercut the deterrence objectives of the program. 
 
In sum, loss-spreading provides at best only a very weak justification for securities 
misinformation insurance, and only for non-diversified investors (and only with easy opt-out).  
The case for securities misinformation insurance would be much stronger if it could rest on 
systemic benefits for the Canadian securities markets.  There are two candidates: 
 
• Increased investor confidence due to what amounts to a warranty of transparency with 
regard to the securities protected by the insurance; and 
 
• Reduced securities misinformation losses due to improved securities law compliance 
attributable to the new insurance program.  
 
How realistic are these benefits?  How would we know whether these benefits outweigh the drag 
on earnings from the loading costs of the new insurance program? 
 
The second of these questions is the easier to answer.  To evaluate whether the investor 
confidence benefits outweigh the insurance costs, one can track price/earnings ratios and more 
subtle measures of investor confidence before and after the insurance program is announced. If 





.     
      
 
Evaluating the enforcement benefits would be more difficult, for two reasons.  First, the new 
secondary market liability regimes have just gone into effect, so it would be difficult to determine 
whether the insurance program or the new liability were responsible for any enforcement benefits.  
Second, a new insurance program is almost certain to have reporting effects, meaning that the 
number of securities misinformation claims will increase even if the number of securities 
misinformation events actually declines.       
 
In any event, precision is not necessary at this point, because the benefits cannot really be 
quantified with any precision in advance.  The decision to proceed depends on the confidence that 
members of the Task Force have in the likelihood of systemic benefits.  A report from an 
insurance expert cannot provide that confidence.  All that it can do is to raise issues, propose a 
framework for analysis, lay out the design variables, and describe the potential securities 
misinformation insurance programs in sufficient detail that the Task Force can evaluate whether 
the systemic benefits are sufficiently probable to justify further work to specify and price a 
securities misinformation insurance program.  
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